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STANLEY V. STANLEY-OCCUPATION OF AND CONTRIBUTION TO "MATRIMONIAL" HOME BY MTISTRESS- RIGHTS TO PROPERTY IN CONTRACT,
QUANTUM MERUIT, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL OR TRUST. The 1960 decision
of the Supreme Court of Alberta in the case of Stan7ey v. Staney
raised the problem of the right of a mistress to remain in occupation
of a house purchased by her paramour when the relationship between
the parties ceases. Milvain J. held that, in the particular circumstances, the mistress was entitled to half interest in the property.
Although it is somewhat difficult to say upon what principles the case
was decided, the result would seem to be proper in the circumstances.
The defendant proposed marriage to the plaintiff in March, 1944,
shortly after the parties first met, but was informed by the plaintiff
that she was already married to a man from whom she had not heard
since 1940. The parties cohabited thereafter for a period of fourteen
years, despite the facts that the plaintiff had not obtained a divorce
and that a valid marriage ceremony with the defendant had not taken
place. Their relationship was harmonious and the plaintiff was of
material assistance in the advancement of the defendant's career.
In the spring of 1953, the parties decided to build a home on a
lot that was acquired by the defendant. At that time, the plaintiff
asked the defendant whether her name was "on the title", and the
defendant replied: "This is your house". The defendant, on a second
occasion prior to the completion of the mortgage, gave the plaintiff
a similar assurance. The plaintiff signed the mortgage three times;
once as what the learned judge referred to as a maker though her
name did not appear as a mortgagor, again as a guarantor and lastly
as a wife executing her consent under the Dower Act. The plaintiff
took an active part in the construction of the house, purchased the
furniture and furnishings and paid landscaping costs. She did not,
however, actually contribute to the purchase price. In 1957, "marital"
difficulties arose, and the defendant departed, leaving the plaintiff in
occupation of the premises.
Milvain J. begins his analysis of the rights of the plaintiff by a
statement of the principle that any contract made in consideration of
of
future illicit co-habitation is void and of no effect. After a review
2
various English and Canadian cases, the learned Judge says:
"I am therefore of the opinion that had the title to the property In
question been placed in the name of the plaintiff or in the joint names
of the two parties, the situation could not be attacked on the ground of
immoral consideration. Furthermore, had the defendant merely entered
into a formal agreement to place the property in their joint names, or In
the name of the plaintiff, that agreement would be enforceable, unless It
appeared in evidence that the consideration was in fact that the Illicit
co-habitation should continue. In this case, there was no such formal
agreement and one wonders whether that should end the matter".

This passage would appear to indicate that the evidence here did
not disclose an illegal consideration. However, nowhere in the reasons
1 (1960), 30 W.W.R. 686; 23 D.L.R. (2d) 620.
223 D.L.R. (2d) at p. 624; 30 W.W.R. at p. 690.
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for judgment does the trial judge make a positive finding that a contract had been formed; nor does he state the manner in which the
requisites for the formation of a contract were satisfied. It is conceivable that the statement of the defendant, "This is your house",
could be said to be an offer and that the conduct of the plaintiff could
amount to an acceptance. Consideration could be found in promises
of the plaintiff to supervise construction, to furnish the house, to
landscape the grounds and to guarantee the mortgage. The difficulty
is that there were no express promises and no basis warranting an
implication as suggested. Further objection may be made on the
ground that there is no evidence that the defendant requested or
bargained for any such promises of performances. Literally, his words
are apt only to express a present gift or, possibly an intention to make
a gift in the future.
Milvain 3. continues: 3
"It is my conclusion that when the defendant stated 'this is your house'
or 'Donna, this is your house' he gave her an assurance of a legal position
that the property was hers at least to the same extent as if it were the
matrimonial home of a married couple. She acted upon that assurance in
spending her money and effort in developing the property and in furnishing it as she has related. Moreover, it his uncontradicted evidence that
she believed the defendant when he gave assurance, which he must have
intended she would believe and act upon".
To support this result the statement of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel of Denning L.J., in the case of Lyle-Meler v. Lewis & Co.
(Westminster) Ltd.,4 is quoted. However, if there is a valid contract
supported by consideration there would appear to be no need to rely
on equitable estoppel. On the other hand, if there is no contract the
plaintiff in these circumstances would appear to be under the necessity
of relying upon equitable estoppel as constituting, in itself, a cause
of action. Yet the English courts, including the Court of Appeal in
the LyWe-Meller case, have refused to recognize that the doctrine has
any. such wide application.5 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada
in The Governors of Dalhousie College at Halifax v. The Estate of
Arthur Boutilier, Decd.6 has indicated that no such extension of
the doctrine should be made.
The learned trial judge also recognizes the possibility of a claim
in quantum meruit.7 However, if there is a contract, it seems
reasonably clear that there cannot be a quantum meruit recovery on
the basis of an implied promise and it remains doubtful whether such
a recovery could be sustained on the theory of an obligation imposed
by the court. If there is no contract, there would be no bar to the
implication of a promise, but the promise found by implication has
usually been limited to a pecuniary award of reasonable remuneration
323 D.L.R. (2d) at p. 625; 30 W.W.R. at p. 691.

[19561 1 All E.R. 247 at 250, 251; [19561 1 W.L.R. 29 (CA.).
6 [1934] S.C.R. 642, at 652; [19341 3 D.L.R. 593, at 600 (S.C.C. on appeal
from S.C.N.S.).
7 Supra footnote 2.
4

5 Combe v. Combe, [19511 1 All E.R. 767; [1951) 2 K.B. 215.
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for services of a reasonable price for goods, and has not been extended
to confer an interest in real property.
Milvain J. seems to equate the relationship of the parties in this
case to cases involving property rights in a matrimonial home where
one spouse has deserted, leaving the other in occupation. Although
many may find it difficult to find a satisfactory reason for distinguishing between the property rights of married persons and those of
unmarried persons living together, the English Court of Appeal in
the recent case of DiwelZ v. Farnes decided that there was a difference. There, Hodson L.J. held that the principle of equality of division
as laid down by Lord Evershed M.R. in Rimm.r v. Rimmer9 could
not be applied because:10
"No contract or joint enterprise can be spelled out of the relationship of
man and mistress".
The matrimonial cases could not be applied even by analogy
because:
"The dispute is not concerned with a matrimonial home and Is to be
treated accordingly, in my opinion, as a dispute between strangers, the
plaintiff's position being that she stands in the shoes of the deceased who
was a stranger in law to the defendant".
Although the decision would thus appear to be in direct conflict
with that of the English Court of Appeal, nevertheless it is submitted
that the better reasoning would be that the principle laid down in
Rimmer v. Rimmer should not be confined to cases between husband
and wife. It would appear to be of a much wider application and
should be invoked in cases where it can be shown that both parties
have equitable interests in the property, but where it would be difficult
or impossible to determine with exactitude the proportions in which
they have respectively contributed to the acquisition of the property.
It is submitted that in those cases recourse should be had to the
principle "equity delighteth in equality".
Milvain J. concludes:"
"It is my conclusion and I so find, that the defendant holds title to the
property in question in trust for himself and the plaintiff in equal shares".
Some ambiguity is evident in the use of the term "in trust". The
learned trial judge apparently does not mean that an express trust
was declared by the defendant by his statement that the house
belonged to the plaintiff for, if that statement is to be taken literally,
the result would be that the entire financial interest in the property
would pass to the plaintiff and not, as the learned Judge concludes,
simply a one-half interest. Nor from the evidence stated in the
reasons for judgment is it possible to conclude that there was a
sufficiently clear manifestation of intention to create a trust on the
part of the defendant. Furthermore, the requirement of writing to
8 [1959] 1 W.L.R. 624 (C.A.).

9 [1953] 1 Q.B. 67 at 72 (C.A.).
'o Supra footnote 8 at p. 627.
123 D.L.R. (2d) 620 at 625; 30 W.W.R. 686 at 690.
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evidence the declaration of a trust of land would not appear to be met
Neither does this factual situation fall within the categories of resulting trusts. This is not the case of the purchase and payment for land
by one person, title being taken in the name of another person.
Perhaps, therefore, the best explanation is that a constructive trust
was imposed to prevent an unjust enrichment, upon analogy to section
160 of the American Restatement of Restitution.' 2
There is a manifest difference between an action for remuneration promised in consideration of an ilicit relationship and a suit for
property, the result of capital, industry, labour and economy. A
person in the position of this plaintiff should be entitled to half the
property where her capital and effort have so largely contributed
toward the end product. If law is to be an expression of social values
and to keep pace with the changing views of private and social interests, the decision of Milvain J., is to be preferred over the "strangers
in law" theory of the English Court of Appeal.
P. J. BRUNNER*
OF
DoMICiLE OF SERVICEMEN -AcQUISITION
DOMICILE OF CHOICE - DECLARATIONS OF INTENTION. Young v.
Young' is important as an example of the difficulty in attributing a
domicile to a person in certain fact situations. Although the rules for
determining domicile are simple and easily understood, great dfficulty
lies in their application to particular facts.
In this case the female petitioner sought a divorce on the ground
of her husband's adultery. The petition was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction in that the respondent, who did not defend this action,
was not domiciled in Manitoba. The respondent's domicile of origin
was Newfoundland. Evidence was given indicating that he enlisted
in the Army in order to get away permanently from that province.
He was stationed in Manitoba where he met the petitioner, married
her and lived with her only briefly after his discharge. The parties
soon separated and the respondent re-enlisted in the Army and has
since been posted to Alberta or Saskatchewan. There was evidence
that the respondent had said on several occasions that he intended to
settle down in Manitoba with his wife.
In the Court of Appeal, Adamson C.J.M. in an unfortunately
short, dissenting judgment felt that the respondent husband was domiciled in Manitoba and would have granted the decree nisi. His Lordship, after stating the facts, seemed to have no doubt that there was
a domicile of choice established in Manitoba relying, it appears, on
the marriage and residence in the province and the evidence of the
YOUNG V. YOUNG

12 "160. Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly
enriched if he were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises."
ED. NoTo: Since this comment was written, many of the issues involved
have been dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada in Thompson v.
Thompson, [1961] S.C.R. 3.
*Mr. Brunner is in the Second Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 (1960), 21 D.L.R. (2d) 616.

